



The applicability of the ECHR in contested territories 








This article examines the applicability of the European Convention for Human Rights 
(ECHR) when a State loses control over parts of its territory. It argues that the 
jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights, which insists on residual positive 
obligations based in sovereign title over territory, is problematic and needs to be 
rethought. The Court’s current approach is not only likely to provoke backlash, since it 
requires it to decide politically explosive questions of sovereign title, but does so for very 
little practical benefit for the protection of human rights. The article therefore explores 
more preferable alternatives.  
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The world is replete with examples of contested territories, in which there is a dispute over 
sovereignty, or the title-bearing State is unable to exercise control over all of its territory – 
consider only  the hold that, until very recently, the Islamic State terrorist group had over vast 
swathes of Iraq and Syria. Such situations also exist in Europe and they have increasingly arisen 
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in cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This article explores the 
applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in contested territories, in 
light of the Court’s case law. This topic has not attracted much attention in the academic 
literature,1 but its significance, politically and legally, is both manifest and is likely to be on the 
rise. For instance, the Court currently has on its docket an interstate case between Georgia and 
Russia, three interstate cases between Ukraine and Russia, and thousands of individual 
applications which concern either Crimea or Eastern Ukraine. 
 This article’s main focus is on the threshold question of the ECHR’s applicability, rather 
than on its substantive application – that is, we will be looking at whether the ECHR applies in 
contested territories, rather than at how its rights and obligations apply in specific factual 
contexts. However, although these two issues are conceptually distinct, as a matter of practical 
reality they are not; it is inevitable that potential substantive consequences influence legal and 
policy views on threshold questions.2 This article argues that the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
ECHR’s applicability in contested territories is evolving – which is a good thing, because that 
evolution is much needed – but that the overall direction of this evolution remains unclear. The 
article sets out the different options that the Court might take in this dynamic process, with their 
upsides and downsides. 
 Section 2 defines the scope of our inquiry, by setting out the basic framework of the 
Convention’s territorial scope of application under Article 1 thereof, and by examining different 
types of contested territories. Section 3 provides an overview of Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
situations of loss of state control over parts of its territory. Section 4 evaluates the Court’s 
approach and argues that it needs to be rethought. In particular, the idea of residual positive 
obligations grounded solely in sovereign title is conceptually unsound and normatively 
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unappealing. We argue that it should be abandoned in favour of better alternatives. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
II. FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITIONS 
 
A. Territorial applicability under Article 1 ECHR 
Pursuant to Article 1 ECHR, ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention.’ Obligations of State parties are 
thus triggered once a person is within a State party’s jurisdiction, a concept which proved to be 
of key importance in the Court’s jurisprudence and which, despite its deceptive simplicity, 
proved difficult to apply in practice.3 Jurisdiction became a threshold criterion that determines 
whether there is an international obligation for a State party under the ECHR vis-à-vis a given 
individual, which is a precondition for its international responsibility. Only when there is an 
international obligation for a state, may its breach lead to the state’s international responsibility.4  
The ECtHR has interpreted this threshold criterion of State jurisdiction to primarily have 
a territorial meaning, and at that one which should also be informed by the concept of 
jurisdiction in general international law.5 The Court’s latter position is erroneous. It conflates the 
word ‘jurisdiction’ in Article 1 with the general international law concepts of State prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction, which have a manifestly different purpose than Article 1, viz. the 
extension of a state’s own domestic law to a certain situation, and the enforcement of that law, as 
it relates to the sovereignty of other states.6 The former point is however correct simply as a 
descriptive matter – the vast majority of the acts or relationships regulated by the ECHR will 
take place on the state’s own territory. In that regard, there is an evidentiary presumption that a 
                                                 
3 The ECtHR also relied on Article 1 in developing positive obligations under the Convention. See DJ Harris, M 
O’Boyle, EP Bates, CM Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (OUP 2014) 21. 
4 An internationally wrongful act of a state, which entails the international responsibility of that state, exists when an 
action or omission (a) is attributable to the state under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the state. See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth 
Session, Supplement No. 10, UN doc A/56/10,  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf, 20 July 2017 (ILC ASR), arts. 1 and 2.  
5 Banković et al. v Belgium et al.  [GC], Application No 52207/99, Decision of 12 December 2001, paras 59-63; Al 
Skeini et al. v the United Kingdom,  Application No 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011, para 131.  
6 See generally Milanović (n 2) 21-41. 
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State has jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 over all of its territory.7 However, as we will 
explain in more detail below, the Court also held that, in exceptional circumstances, this 
presumption could be rebutted or altered.8  
In line with other human rights bodies, the Court has interpreted the word ‘jurisdiction’ in 
two basic ways.9 First, as a spatial concept – an individual is within a state’s jurisdiction if they 
are located within a territory or area over which the State has effective overall control. Second, 
as a personal concept – an individual is within a state’s jurisdiction if they were subject to the 
authority or control of a State agent. Both models of jurisdiction were reaffirmed in Al-Skeini, 
which remains the Court’s leading case on Article 1.10 However, most leading Article 1 cases 
concern situations of the ECHR extraterritorial applicability, e.g. to the conduct of British troops 
in the occupation of Iraq, while our main concern here is the applicability of the Convention 
within a state’s territory when the State has lost control over that territory.  
B. Position under general international law 
The general international law of treaties does not provide much guidance with regard to the 
application of treaties to parts of State territory outside its control. Article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the 
treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire 
territory.’11 The focus of this provision is, however, on treaty-making by states which have 
territorial sub-units with a significant degree of political autonomy. In the context of federal or 
non-unitary states federal clauses can permit a state’s units to be exempt from the scope of the 
treaty or limit obligations of the federal/non-unitary State in the matters that are outside of its 
constitutional power.12 There is no such clause in the ECHR.13 The Convention does however 
                                                 
7 See Assanidze v Georgia, Application No 71503/01, Judgment of 8 April 2004, para 139; Ilaşcu et al. v Moldova 
and Russia, Application No 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004, para 312.  
8 See Assanidze, para 139; Ilaşcu, para 312. 
9 See generally Milanović, (n 2); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para 10. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 179, para 109. 
10 Al-Skeini, paras 133-140. 
11 Art. 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS, vol. 1155, 331. See more S. Karagiannis, ‘The 
Territorial Application of Treaties,’ in D.B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 305. 
12 ILC ASR (n 4), 42, para 10,  A. Aust, “Treaties, Territorial Application”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law/Heidelberg and OUP, 
Heidelberg and Oxford 2012, 5, para 22. 
13 There is one in Art 28 of the American Convention on Human Rights. UNTS, vol. 1144, 123.  
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have a colonial clause, which performs similar functions for (overseas) territories for whose 
international relations a State is responsible, and which is of no relevance to us here.14  
The issue of the Convention’s applicability to contested territories is thus not determined 
by rules of general international law, but by the interpretation of the Convention itself, especially 
its Article 1. In that regard, the Court has in its case law precluded one option for varying the 
Convention’s territorial scope – reservations – by ruling that a State could not make a valid 
reservation to the ECHR pursuant to its Article 57 the effect of which would be a territorial 
limitation on obligations.15 Thus, when a non-unitary/federal State faces challenges in securing 
ECHR’s rights and freedoms within its territorial units and autonomous regions simply due to its 
internal constitutional arrangements, this will not influence the scope of its obligations under the 
ECHR, as was held in Assanidze v. Georgia.16 In that case, Georgia was responsible for the 
violations of the ECHR due to the conduct of the authorities of the Ajarian Autonomous 
Republic (AAR), an integral part of Georgia enjoying a high level of autonomy. Namely, the 
applicant remained in prison in the AAR despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Georgia 
discontinued the criminal proceedings and ordered his immediate release. The fact that the AAR 
authorities failed to implement this decision did not affect Georgia’s international responsibility, 
which extended to the conduct of the AAR.17  
 
C. Defining contested territories 
The term ‘contested territories’ that we are employing here is not a legal term of art, but is useful 
shorthand for several different types of situations which entail the loss of territorial control, and 
which we will now elaborate on. First, we can distinguish between territorial contestation that is 
primarily internal, i.e. coming from within the relevant State, and contestation which is primarily 
external, i.e. involves another State.  
In the first scenario, the State loses control over a part of its territory due to its inability to 
suppress the activities of a non-state actor in the area, provide basic public functions and 
                                                 
14 See Art. 56 ECHR; see more L. Moor, B. Simpson, ‘Ghosts of Colonialism in the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2005) 76 British Yearbook of International Law 121. 
15 See Assanizde, para 140; Sargsyan v Azerbaijan [GC], Application No 40167/06, Decision of 16 June 2015, paras 
63-70, 93.  
16 Assanidze, para 141. 
17 ibid para 56. 
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maintain its monopoly on the use of force. On one end of the spectrum, we can have situations of 
State failure in which the area concerned degenerates into a chaotic ‘ungoverned space’ – 
consider, for instance, the difficulties that Mexico or Colombia have faced over the years with 
suppressing the activities of drug cartels on their territories. On the other, the relevant non-state 
actor can be highly organized and exhibit quasi- or parastatal qualities. Such entities may be 
openly separatist and may even formally claim independence from the parent State – consider, 
for example, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus vis-à-vis Cyprus; Kosovo vis-à-vis 
Serbia; or South Ossetia and Abkhazia vis-à-vis Georgia. 
In the second scenario, a third State wrests control of an area from the territorial 
sovereign. The clearest such example today would be Crimea, which Russia formally (if clearly 
unlawfully) annexed from Ukraine. More common would be situations in which the third State 
does not claim sovereignty over the area which it took control of – for example, Russia’s control 
over parts of Georgia proper during the 2008 Georgia/Russia conflict, or, outside Europe, the 
UK’s control over parts of Iraq and Afghanistan during the conflicts there. In all of these 
situations the territorial State loses control over some or even all of its territory due to outside 
intervention. 
The two scenarios set out above may overlap. This is the case in situations in which a 
third State intervenes in the territorial State by way of a proxy non-state actor. The issue in such 
cases is whether the third State controls the area concerned through its own armed forces and 
other organs and agents, as has been the case with Turkey’s control over Northern Cyprus, or 
whether the third State controls the non-state actor itself, whether pursuant to the general rules of 
attribution in the law of state responsibility18 or, perhaps, some ECHR-specific rules of 
attribution.19 Consider, for example, the relationship between Russia and the Donetsk and 
                                                 
18 Most relevant here would be attribution due to de facto organ status arising from a relationship of complete 
dependence and control between the intervening State and the proxy non-state actor, which attributes all of the 
conduct of the non-state actor to the State concerned pursuant to the rule in Art. 4 ILC ASR, and attribution based on 
the State instructions or effective control over the specific conduct of the non-state actor, under Art. 8 ILC ASR. See 
generally J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 124-126, 146-156. 
19 The Court has never been clear on whether it is (exceptionally) applying ECHR-specific rules of attribution 
(which would be regarded as lex specialis under Art. 55 ILC ASR), but some of its cases could easily be so 
interpreted – see, e.g., Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, Judgment of 10 May 2001, para 77 (‘[Turkey’s] 
responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also be 
engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other 
support.’ – ‘survival’ is similar, but not necessarily the same, as the complete dependence test in general 
international law); para. 81 (‘the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of 
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Luhansk rebels in the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, or Russia’s relationship with South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia in Georgia. Clearly, as far as any litigation before the ECtHR is concerned, the key 
question here would be what evidence exists as to the exact nature of this relationship, i.e. 
whether the non-state group is merely being supported by the intervening State or is in fact that 
state’s proxy. 
When there is a sovereignty dispute over a territory between two states parties to the 
ECHR, one likely consequence of the competing sovereignty claims is that the states concerned 
will not tend to deny the ECHR’s applicability to the territory. For example, Russia will not 
contest the ECHR’s applicability to its own conduct in Crimea after the annexation, because 
doing so would be incongruent with its own claim to sovereignty over the area. A shift in 
territorial control would thus, at least in principle, not result in a total vacuum of human rights 
protection for the population of the area concerned. Scenarios in which the competing 
sovereignty claim is raised by a separatist entity whose claim to statehood is not undisputed, as is 
for instance the case with Kosovo and Serbia (or potentially with Catalonia and Spain), are more 
difficult. If the entity in question is unable to obtain a sufficient measure of recognition and 
membership in the Council of Europe, it will not be able to become a party to the ECHR and a 
protection vacuum becomes more likely.20  
In short, in determining the nature of a contested territory we can ask the following 
questions: is there an entity which has supplanted the territorial sovereign in its control over the 
area concerned, and what kind of an entity is it? Is it (1) a simple non-state armed group; (2) a 
highly organized, parastatal non-state actor; (3) a highly organized non-state actor claiming 
independent statehood; (4) a non-state actor which is a proxy of a third, intervening State; (5) the 
organs and agents of a third State acting directly, claiming (or not) sovereignty over the 
contested area. To these questions we can add a further, temporal one – how long has the 
situation of contestation lasted, or is likely to last? We can thus observe how territorial 
                                                                                                                                                             
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage that 
State's responsibility under the Convention.’ – again, not an approach easily squared with the ILC ASR). These tests 
have been reaffirmed in multiple subsequent judgments, but again it is not clear whether the Court thinks it is 
applying (correctly or not) a general international law attribution framework or a Convention-specific one. See, e.g., 
Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania [GC], Application No 2330/09, Judgment of 9 July 2013, para 76; El-
Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], Application No 39630/09, Judgment of 13 December 
2012, paras 206 & 211. 
20 See more part III.D below. 
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contestation can be acute or short-term on the one hand, or chronic, stable and long-term on the 
other. The territorial sovereign’s loss of control over a part of its territory could be very short-
lived, lasting a few days or weeks, or it could be prolonged, lasting many years or even decades. 
For example, Georgia lost control of the city of Gori to Russian forces for some 10 days in 
August 2008, but its loss of control over (most of) South Ossetia and Abkhazia dates to the mid 
1990s, and it is not likely to regain control in the foreseeable future. Cyprus has not been in 
control over the northern part of the island since 1974. Ukraine is similarly not likely to regain 
control over Crimea anytime soon, if ever. 
Bearing in mind these different situations of territorial contestations, let us turn to an 
examination of the ECtHR’s relevant case law. 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE ON THE LOSS OF TERRITORIAL 
CONTROL  
A. Initial approach: the presumption of jurisdiction and its rebuttal 
The initial approach of the European Commission to situations of loss of a state’s control over its 
territory was simple: there was a presumption that the State had control over all of the territory to 
which it had title, but that presumption was rebuttable on the facts. If it was indeed rebutted, the 
territorial State no longer had obligations under the ECHR, as it no longer had jurisdiction in the 
sense of Article 1 over the area concerned. The first such cases were those on northern Cyprus. 
In 1974, the separatist Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established through 
the use of regular Turkish armed forces. The presumption of Cyprus’ jurisdiction was rebutted 
either expressly,21 or by implication, in cases against Turkey, which was held to have 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in northern Cyprus and consequently obligations under the ECHR.22  
                                                 
21 See e.g. ECmHR, Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 8007/77, Decision of 10 July 1978, paras 23-24. 
22 Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras 77-78.The ECtHR held that in such 
circumstances a different finding from the one that they were within jurisdiction of Turkey would leave applicants in 
a “regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection.” ibid para 78. The reference to a vacuum is an 
indirect assessment that Cyprus no longer exercised jurisdiction over the area. 
9 
 
In a single case brought against Cyprus for violations of the ECHR in the north, the 
Commission declared the application inadmissible due to its incompatibility with Article 1 
ECHR:23  
The Commission has previously observed that "the European Convention on Human 
Rights continues to apply to the whole of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus" and that 
the recognition by Turkey of the Turkish Cypriot administration in the north of Cyprus as 
"Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" does not affect "the continuing existence of the 
Republic of Cyprus as a single State and High Contracting Party to the Convention" (No. 
8007/77, Cyprus v.  Turkey, Dec. 10.7.78, D.R. 13, p. 85 at pp. 149-150). 
 
At the same time, however, the Commission has also found that the Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus "have since 1974 been prevented from exercising their jurisdiction in 
the north of the island.  This restriction on the actual exercise of jurisdiction ... is due to 
the presence of Turkish armed forces" (ibid.). 
 
The Commission now finds that the authority of the respondent Government is in fact 
still limited to the southern part of Cyprus. It follows that the Republic of Cyprus cannot 
be held responsible under Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention for the acts of Turkish 
Cypriot authorities in the north of Cyprus of which the present applicants complain.24 
 
The Commission’s reference to Cyprus’ lack of responsibility for the acts of Turkish 
Cypriot authorities could be interpreted as the application of an attribution test. In context, 
however, it is clear that the Commission was thinking in terms of lack of obligation on the part 
of Cyprus, due to its lack of actual jurisdiction in the north. Note also how the Commission did 
not hesitate to expressly affirm Cyprus’ continued sovereignty over the contested territory. In its 
1996 Loizidou judgment the Court likewise recalled the rejection of the TRNC’s claim to 
statehood by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and European institutions, stating that 
‘the international community does not regard the "TRNC" as a State under international law and 
that the Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus - itself, 
bound to respect international standards in the field of the protection of human and minority 
rights.’25 The Court did not however remark on the scope of Cyprus’ obligation due to its lack of 
territorial control, as it was not called upon to do so. 
                                                 
23 ECmHR, An and Others v Cyprus, Application No 18270/91, Decision of 18 October 1991. 
24 ibid  
25 Loizidou v Turkey (merits), Application No 15318/89, Judgment of 18 December 1996, para 44. 
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The Court followed the Commission’s presumption/rebuttal approach in its 2004 
Assanidze judgment, as noted above. Importantly, Georgia did not dispute that the applicant was 
within its jurisdiction, but the ECtHR nevertheless went on to discuss whether there was valid 
evidence of the AAR’s separatist ambitions or effective control of another State to rebut the 
presumption of jurisdiction,26 and found there was none.27 Only a few months later, however, the 
Court did something very different in Ilaşcu et al. v. Moldova and Russia.  
B. Ilaşcu and Catan: jurisdiction attenuated, but not removed 
In Ilaşcu the ECtHR had to decide on the responsibility of Moldova and Russia for the illegal 
arrest, detention and ill-treatment of four Moldovan nationals in Transdniestria, in the east of 
Moldova,28 where the separatist “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (MRT) was 
proclaimed.29 Moldova did not have effective control over the area,30 while Russia – unlike 
Turkey in the Northern Cyprus – did not occupy Transdniestria but contributed to the creation of 
the MRT, and provided political, economic and military support to it.31 Because of this, even 
after violent clashes between Transdniestrian separatist forces and the Moldovan security forces 
(end of 1991–beginning of 1992),32 Moldova did not regain control over this part of its 
territory.33 It subsequently made political efforts to re-establish control over Transdniestria; as of 
mid-1992 it adopted an acquiescent attitude towards the situation in Transdniestria,34 maintained 
a limited control over the issue of identity cards and customs stamps and had „more or less de 
facto relations” with Transdniestrian authorities in some fields.35  
In Ilaşcu, the ECtHR’s starting point was that the presumption of a state’s jurisdiction  
may be limited [only] in exceptional circumstances, particularly where a State is 
prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory. That may be as a result of 
military occupation by the armed forces of another State which effectively controls the 
                                                 
26 Assanidze, paras 133 and 134. 
27 ibid paras 139-143.  
28 Ilaşcu, para 331. 
29 ibid. This entity was not internationally recognized. ibid para 2.  
30 ibid para 331. 
31 ibid paras 382, 392.  
32 ibid para 51. 
33 ibid para 65. 
34 ibid para 329. 
35 ibid paras 179-180. 
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territory concerned […], acts of war or rebellion, or the acts of a foreign State supporting 
the installation of a separatist State within the territory of the State concerned.36 
 
Note the reference to a limitation rather than a rebuttal of jurisdiction. The Court then 
held that Moldova did not exercise authority over part of its territory, which was under the 
effective control of the MRT,37 but nevertheless found that it still had positive obligations under 
Article 1in order to secure ECHR rights.38 These residual positive obligations are twofold, 
including measures (1) aimed at re-establishing its control over the territory in question, and (2) 
securing the applicants’ individual rights.39 Hence, the factual situation in the Transdniestrian 
region did not mean that Moldova ceased to have jurisdiction, and thus obligations, under the 
ECHR. Rather, its jurisdiction was reduced in scope to certain specified positive obligations:  
On the basis of all the material in its possession, the Court considers that the Moldovan 
Government, the only legitimate government of the Republic of Moldova under 
international law, does not exercise authority over part of its territory, namely that part 
which is under the effective control of the “MRT”. ... However, even in the absence of 
effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation 
under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other 
measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to 
secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.40  
 
The ECtHR thus held that Moldova violated these obligations because after 2001 it failed to 
discuss the applicants’ case in the negotiations for a settlement of the situation in Transdniestria, 
and failed to consider or take any other steps to secure to the applicants their ECHR rights.41 
The holding of the ECtHR in this case was innovative for several reasons. First, 
jurisdiction was not discussed in terms of a presumption and its rebuttal, as before. The previous 
position was both less flexible and more in line with the wording of Article 1 – a State either had 
jurisdiction or it did not. There was no room for reductions, or for ‘dividing and tailoring,’42 to 
allow for a different scope of obligations depending on the exceptional circumstances of a case.43 
                                                 
36 ibid para 312. Emphasis added. 
37 ibid para 330. 
38 ibid paras 331-333.  
39 ibid paras 339, 340-346.  
40 ibid paras 333-334. Emphasis added. 
41 ibid para 350. 
42 This expression was used in the context of extraterritorial application. Cf. Banković, para 75 and Al-Skeini, para 
137. 
43 See also Mujezinović Larsen (n 1)  86. 
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Nor did, again, the wording of Article 1 provide support for the Ilaşcu residual positive 
obligations. Second, the notion of positive obligations was never given such an independent 
existence up to this point. Unlike in previous case law – where it was developed to ensure 
effective protection of a specific substantive right by requiring a State not only to refrain from 
violation but also to take steps to secure it44 – in Ilaşcu positive obligations were invoked in 
respect to the ECHR as whole.45 Finally, the ECtHR also considered applicants to concurrently 
be within the jurisdiction of Russia.46 Russia’s jurisdiction was extraterritorial,47 and existed 
because the MRT remained ‘under [its] effective authority, or at the very least under [its] 
decisive influence.’48 In such circumstances, Russia needed to secure the entire set of substantive 
rights provided in the ECHR.49  
The Court affirmed its Ilaşcu approach in Catan, a subsequent case dealing with 
violations of the right to education in Transdniestria:50  
[I]n the Ilaşcu judgment, cited above, the Court held that individuals detained in 
Transdniestria fell within Moldova’s jurisdiction because Moldova was the territorial 
State, even though it did not have effective control over the Transdniestrian region. 
Moldova’s obligation under Article 1 of the Convention, to “secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the [Convention] rights and freedoms”, was, however, limited in the 
circumstances to a positive obligation to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other 
measures that were both in its power to take and in accordance with international law … 
The Court sees no ground on which to distinguish the present case. Although Moldova 
has no effective control over the acts of the “MRT” in Transdniestria, the fact that the 
region is recognised under public international law as part of Moldova’s territory gives 
rise to an obligation, under Article 1 of the Convention, to use all legal and diplomatic 
means available to it to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention to those living there.51 
 
On the facts, however, and unlike in Ilaşcu, the Court found that Moldova had indeed 
satisfied its positive obligations.52 It also found that Russia continued to exercise jurisdiction 
                                                 
44 See Harris et al. (n 3) 21-23. See also A.R. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004). 
45 See more Mujezinović Larsen (n 1) 86. 
46 Ilaşcu, para 394. 
47 ibid paras 314-316. 
48 ibid para 392. 
49 See also Cyprus v Turkey, paras 76-77. 
50 Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia, Application Nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, Judgment of 19 
October 2012. 
51 ibid para 110. 
52 ibid paras 145-148. 
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over the separatist entity in Transdniestria, despite Russia’s somewhat diminished presence on 
the ground in the intervening years.53 On the merits, however, the Court was again not 
sufficiently precise in distinguishing between issues of jurisdiction and attribution of conduct. It 
is not clear from the judgment whether the Court is finding Russia responsible for the acts of 
separatist authorities because these are attributable to Russia, or because Russia failed to comply 
with a positive obligation to prevent such violations by a non-state actor operating within an area 
under its jurisdiction.54 
In sum, in both Ilaşcu and Catan we can observe how Russia’s plenary jurisdiction over 
Transdniestria offset Moldova’s limited jurisdiction for fulfilling only positive obligations.55 In 
its most recent jurisprudence on the issue, the ECtHR was explicit in this respect: a limited 
jurisdiction of the territorial State was compensated by another ECHR State party’s jurisdiction 
arising fully and extraterritorially.56 Conversely, however, the Court did not seem prepared to 
tolerate a vacuum – if there is no other State exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the area 
concern, the territorial state’s jurisdiction would remain intact, without an Ilascu-type reduction.  
This will be discussed in the next section.  
C. Sargsyan: jurisdiction undiminished 
The case of Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan arose in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The applicants were denied return to their village, situated in 
the territory of Azerbaijan, but close to or on the line of contact between this State and the self-
proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The village was destroyed, mined and remained 
inaccessible to any civilian.57  
Azerbaijan argued that a concept developed in Ilasçu – a limited responsibility of a State 
in the case it lost effective control over part of its territory to another State or separatist regime – 
should equally be applied to disputed zones or ‘areas which are rendered inaccessible by the 
circumstances.’58 However, the ECtHR did not accept this argument.59 Starting from the special 
                                                 
53 ibid paras 121-123. 
54 See more M Milanović, ‘Grand Chamber Judgment in Catan and Others’ (EJIL: Talk!, 21 October 2012)  
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/grand-chamber-judgment-in-catan-and-others/>. 
55 See also Mujezinović Larsen (n 1) 84.  
56 Sargsyan, para 148.  
57 ibid paras 47-49. 
58 ibid paras 145-146. 
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nature of the ECHR – ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public) for 
the protection of individual human beings’60 – the Court emphasized that the whole territory of 
Azerbaijan entered the ‘Convention legal space’ upon its ratification of the ECHR.61 Then it 
proceeded to distinguish Sargsyan from Ilasçu and similar cases,62 on the basis that the area 
(village) in the former case was not occupied by the armed forces of another State, in the sense 
of the international law of belligerent occupation,63 and was not under the control of any 
separatist regime. Finally, the ECtHR used the same argument as the one used for establishing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of Turkey in the case of the Northern Cyprus64 – a need to avoid the 
ECHR protection vacuum65 – to conclude there were no ‘exceptional circumstances of such a 
nature as to qualify [Azerbaijan’s] responsibility under the Convention.’66 
Not only did the ECtHR hold that the exception developed in Ilasçu was not applicable in 
this case, but it compared the situation in Sargsyan to the situation in Assanidze (dealing with 
application of the ECHR to a state’s territorial units), stating that ‘from a legal point of view the 
Government of Azerbaijan has jurisdiction as the territorial State and full responsibility under the 
Convention.’67  
In sum, in Sargsyan the Court was not prepared to accept pockets of vacuum in 
protection that resulted from Azerbaijan’s willingness to maintain a no-man’s land on its line of 
contact with Nagorno-Karabakh. On the merits the Court did take security issues into account, 
finding the ethnic Armenians displaced from the village concerned did not (as of yet) have the 
entitlement to return to the area which was still subject to ongoing military activity, but that 
Azerbaijan had to provide the applicants with alternative measures to secure their property rights 
(which it did not).68 And again, the approach of both the ECtHR and Azerbaijan manifested a 
                                                                                                                                                             
59 ibid para 149. 
60 ibid para 147. 
61 ibid. 
62 Ivanţoc et al. v Moldova and Russia, Application No 23687/05, Judgment of 15 November 2011, para 105; Catan, 
para 109; Sargsyan, paras 140-142.  
63 ibid para 144. See more M Milanović, ‘European Court Decides that Israel Is Not Occupying Gaza’ (EJIL: Talk!, 
17 June 2015) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-that-israel-is-not-occupying-gaza>. 
64 n 22. 
65 Sargsyan, para 148. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid para 150. 
68 ibid paras 233-242 
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long standing confusion between jurisdiction and responsibility69 in the case-law of the ECtHR.70 
Azerbaijan argued it had ‘limited responsibility’ due to exceptional circumstances, not that it had 
limited jurisdiction. The ECtHR accepted this framing, which is conceptually confusing, since 
the term jurisdiction is the basis of a threshold for the existence of legal obligations, while 
responsibility is the consequence of a breach of such obligations which are attributable to the 
state.71 This conceptual confusion was even more evident in Chiragov,72 the companion case 
decided on the same day as Sargsyan, in which the Court found that Armenia exercised 
jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Court did so without specifying which wrongful 
conduct precisely was attributable to Armenia, in effect failing to distinguish between Armenia’s 
control over the territory concerned and its control (or lack thereof) over the separatist entity in 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an actor.73  
This brings us to how the Court dealt with the situation of Serbia and Kosovo, which 
presents a unique factual pattern – that of a territory initially subjected to an international 
administration which then declared independence from its parent state, while attracting a 
substantial, but far from uncontested, level of international recognition.74 
 
D. Serbia and Kosovo: avoiding sovereignty, accepting a vacuum 
After the 1999 NATO intervention, Kosovo, a province of Serbia (then part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)), became a UN-administered territory on the basis of UN Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999).75 After the establishment of the international administration and 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Cyprus v Turkey, para 78. See more Milanović supra note 2, at 41. 
70 See also Sargsyan, concurring opinion of judge Ziemele, para 3.  
71 See also M Milanović, ‘Jurisdiction, Attribution and Responsibility in Jaloud’ (EJIL: Talk!, 11 December 2014) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-responsibility-in-jaloud/>. 
72 Chiragov and Others v Armenia, Application No 13216/05, Judgment of 16 June 2015. 
73 See more M Milanović, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh Cases’ (EJIL: Talk! 23 June 2015) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
nagorno-karabakh-cases/>. 
74 See more T Papić, ‘Fighting for a Seat at the Table: International Representation of Kosovo' (2013) 12 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 543.  
75 This resolution was preceded by the Military Technical Agreement, in which Serbia agreed on withdrawal of FRY 
forces and the presence of an international security force. Text available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/09/kosovo.agreement.text/, 4 September 2017.  More on the 
background see in Behrami and Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and Norway [GC], Application 
Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, Decision of 2 May 2007.  
16 
 
subsequent accession of Serbia to the ECHR76 the issue of Serbia’s obligations under the ECHR 
in Kosovo did not attract much attention. This was simply because no case directly involving 
Serbia’s obligations towards people in Kosovo actually arose while Serbia’s status as Kosovo’s 
nominal sovereign remained undisputed. Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo was confirmed by the 
ECtHR rather casually in the Behrami and Saramati77 case, found to be inadmissible, which 
concerned the conduct of other States parties that contributed to international civil (UNMIK) and 
security (KFOR) presences in Kosovo.78   
Paradoxically, it was only after Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 
2008 that the ECtHR was presented with an opportunity to decide on Serbia’s obligations under 
the ECHR in Kosovo. In Azemi,79 the application related to the non-execution of a municipal 
court judgment rendered in 2002, which ruled in favour of the applicant in a 1990 suit for 
unlawful termination of employment. In November 2013, the ECtHR declared the application 
inadmissible, ruling (as the respondent itself had argued) that Serbia lacked jurisdiction over the 
applicant.80  
Distinguishing the position of Serbia and Kosovo from that of Moldova and 
Transdniestria, the Court observed that ‘there [wa]s no evidence that Serbia exercised any 
control over UNMIK, Kosovo’s judiciary or other institutions that had been established by virtue 
of UNMIK regulations. Neither [could] it be said that the Serbian authorities supported 
militarily, economically, financially or politically Kosovo’s institutions.’81 Noting Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, the number of subsequent recognitions it obtained, and the reduced 
role of UNMIK, the Court concluded that ‘there existed objective limitations which prevented 
                                                 
76 Serbia became bound to the ECHR in March 2004 by way of continuity with the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, as the FRY had previously renamed itself. See more in T Papić, ‘The More You Ignore Me the Closer I 
Get: Application of the European Court of Human Rights’ Standards on the Journalistic Duty of Care in Serbia’ in V 
Beširević (ed), Public Law in Serbia: Twenty Year After (European Public Law Organization 2012) 197. 
77 Behrami, paras 69-70. 
78 Due to their incompatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the ECHR, as the ECtHR viewed all alleged 
violations to be attributed to the UN, since it had, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the international 
presence in Kosovo. See Behrami, paras 128-152. For analysis of the decision see M. Milanović, T. Papić,‘As Bad 
As It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law’ 
(2009) 58 ICLQ 267. 
79 Azemi v Serbia, Application No 11209/09, Decision of 5 November 2013. The applicant argued that this decision 
was based on Serbian legislation ‘as inherited by UNMIK, legally defined the consequences of actions or failure to 
act’ on the part of Serbia when it effectively exercised control over Kosovo. ibid para 37. 
80 ibid paras 33, 49. 
81 ibid paras 43, 45. 
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Serbia from securing the rights and freedoms in Kosovo.’82 Finally, the ECtHR held that the 
applicant did not indicate any suitable measures in respect to his rights which Serbia had the 
power to take, and concluded it could not point to ‘any positive obligations that the respondent 
State had towards the applicant (compare and contrast with Moldova’s positive obligations in the 
case of Ilaşcu […]).’83 
There are many questions raised by this decision which cannot be discussed due to 
limited space.84 The Court’s reasoning is not a model of clarity. At the outset it explicitly took a 
neutral position towards the status of Kosovo, in order to avoid ruling on who the sovereign of 
that territory actually was,85 thus implying a departure from its position in Behrami without 
properly justifying why it was doing so.86 It then vacillated between treating Serbia as the 
territorial State or as a foreign State in respect of the area. An example of the latter was the 
discussion on whether Serbia controlled, financed and supported Kosovo’s institutions,87 by 
analogy to Russia in Ilaşcu.88 As for the former, the Court examined positive obligations and the 
‘objective limitations’ preventing Serbia from securing the ECHR in Kosovo.89 In other words, 
the Court avoided ruling on Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo (or lack thereof) by implicitly 
saying that even if Serbia was the sovereign, and hence had Ilaşcu-type residual positive 
obligations, such obligations were not relevant or were discharged on the facts of the case. The 
key consideration for the Court thus seemed to have been the evasion of the sovereignty issue.  
As a purely pragmatic matter this approach is defensible, even if it is as matter of 
principle at odds with the idea that residual positive obligations follow sovereign title over 
territory. Namely, there are substantial differences between Kosovo and other contested 
territories (Northern Cyprus, Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh) that were discussed by the 
ECtHR previously in the context of jurisdiction. Unlike the latter, Kosovo has been recognized 
                                                 
82 ibid para 46. 
83 ibid para 47. 
84 For discussion of some of the issues see K Istrefi, ‘Azemi v Serbia: discontinuity of Serbia's de jure jurisdiction 
over Kosovo’ (2014) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 388;  Id., ‘Azemi v. Serbia in the European Court of 
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85 Azemi, para 1, fn. 1. 
86 See also arguments offered in Istrefi (n 84) 393. 
87 ibid para 45 
88 See text accompanying note 31. 
89 Azemi, para 46. 
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as an independent State by many States90 and its declaration of independence – effective in 
creating statehood or not – does not violate international law in the eyes of the ICJ.91 These facts 
may have warranted different conclusions on jurisdiction than those which were implied in 
Behrami, rendered before the declaration of independence. On the other hand, Kosovo has not 
been recognized by Serbia and a number of other European States, it is not a UN member or a 
member of the Council of Europe, and is hence unable to become a State party of the ECHR. A 
consequence of the Court’s approach in Azemi is hence that in Kosovo there is precisely the kind 
of vacuum in protection of ECHR rights that it was so desperate to avoid in other cases.92  
Finally, the Court’s analysis of the lack of any obligations on the part of Serbia because it 
did not control, finance or support Kosovo institutions could in fact by applied conversely to 
individuals who live in ethnic Serb enclaves in Kosovo, especially in the north and the Mitrovica 
area, in which Serbia’s influence is extensive, and might – in the right type of case – even be 
regarded as decisive. Serbia’s influence was at its highest during the period in which it funded 
parallel institutions of the Kosovo Serbs.93 Consider also, for example, the recent assassination of 
Oliver Ivanović, a prominent moderate Serb politician in northern Kosovo – depending on the 
facts, one could well imagine Serbia being held to have some positive obligations under Article 2 
ECHR. Serbia in fact wanted to actively participate in the Kosovo authorities’ investigation of 
Ivanović’s murder (a request which the latter rejected on sovereignty grounds), and has taken at 
least some investigative steps on the territory of Serbia proper in that regard.94 A suitable 
comparison point in existing ECtHR case law might be the 2017 Chamber judgment in 
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey,95 in which the Court found Cyprus and Turkey 
responsible under the procedural limb of Article 2 for failing to cooperate with each other in 
                                                 
90 At the time of the completion of this article, it was (according to the Kosovo government) recognized by 113 
states, <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224>. The Serbian government however disputes that some of these 
recognitions in fact occurred, while also claiming that some have been withdrawn. 
91 Due to the fact that international law did not contain a prohibition of such a declaration. ICJ, Accordance with 
international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ 
Rep 403, 436ff. 
92 See also Yudkivska (n 1), at 14. 
93 See more M Prelec and N Rashiti, ‘Serb Integration in Kosovo After the Brussels Agreement’ (Balkans Policy 
Research Group, 19 March 2015) < http://balkansgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Serb-Integration-in-
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dead>. 
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investigating a multiple homicide which occurred in Cypriot territory, whereas relevant evidence 
and suspects were present in Turkish and TRNC-controlled territory.96 While the Chamber was 
split by 5 votes to 2 on whether Cyprus had the duty to cooperate with separatist TRNC 
authorities (the majority essentially finding that it did), it was unanimous that Turkey had the 
obligation to cooperate with Cyprus, solely on the basis that the suspects were present on its 
territory,97 a holding difficult to square with the victim-focused case law on the jurisdiction 
clause in Article 1 ECHR. As of the time of writing, the case is pending before the Grand 
Chamber. 
 
IV. EVALUATING THE COURT’S APPROACH 
It is, as in all matters concerning Article 1 ECHR, difficult to provide a precise descriptive 
account of the ECtHR’s approach to the Convention’s applicability in contested territories. This 
is primarily because the Court’s approach has evolved in a very ad hoc, fact-dependent way. 
Initially the Commission and the Court both applied a simple, binary analysis – if the State 
concerned no longer had control of a part of its territory, then it no longer had jurisdiction over 
that area. The State will be presumed to have control over all territory over which it has title, but 
this is a simple evidentiary presumption which is in line with the fact that most states control 
most of their territory most of the time. This presumption is rebuttable, and the consequence of 
the rebuttal is lack of jurisdiction and therefore lack of any ECHR obligations.  
The main shift in the Court’s approach happens in Ilasçu, where residual positive 
obligations are directly tied to the state’s sovereignty over the territory. Jurisdiction is thus 
reduced in scope in the case of loss of State control over territory, but not extinguished; it 
persists, if diminished, on the basis of title alone. We have seen the various difficulties that the 
Court has had to grapple with post-Ilasçu; another major concern is the continuing confusion 
                                                 
96 ibid, paras 282-297. 
97 ibid, paras 183-189. The Court examined the jurisdiction issue proprio motu, i.e. the Turkish government did not 
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trafficking, and not in respect of the victim’s death, which had occurred in Cyprus. ibid paras 243-247, 307-309. 
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evident in the case law between the notion of jurisdiction in Article 1 and the law of state 
responsibility.  
This brings us to the question of the normative desirability and coherence of the Court’s 
approach. There are at least three fundamental problems with the Court’s development of 
residual positive obligations grounded in sovereign title. First, it has no basis in the text of the 
Convention, and it muddles the legal nature of the concept of jurisdiction in Article 1 ECHR, 
undermining the basic idea that jurisdiction is a factual exercise of State power, either over 
territory (as in Loizidou or Chiragov)98 or over individuals (as in Al-Skeini).99 It is this factual 
notion of jurisdiction that has proven so important in the context of the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR, and there seems to be no good reason of principle to treat intra-
territorial situations any differently.100 Jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 is either the right to 
exercise a power, or the actual exercise of that power, whether lawfully or unlawfully; it cannot 
coherently be both. And there are many good reasons to prefer the latter option, as the Court has 
done in the past, not the least of which is that it closes many loopholes in situations in which 
states interfere with human rights without exercising any kind of entitlement or authority under 
international law (consider everything from a full-scale unlawful invasion of a third country to 
the surveillance,101 abduction102 or even assassination103 of people living there). 
Second, residual positive obligations bring few practical benefits; they will rarely have 
significant bite. Recall how the Court in Ilasçu articulated two such obligations – Moldova’s 
obligation to take reasonable measures to re-establish its control over the contested territory, and 
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military action - whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. 
The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of 
such control (…).’ Chiragov, para 168. 
99 Al-Skeini, paras 133-137. 
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its obligation to engage with the authorities of the contested territory so as to secure the rights of 
the individual applicant.104 The former issue, that of re-establishment of State control, involves 
so many different circumstances and is so politically contingent that it is not capable of any 
meaningful judicial management. Whether Moldova ever takes back control over Transdniestria, 
or Ukraine takes back control over Crimea or the Donbas, or Georgia takes back control over 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, depends least of all on the ECHR and on anything the European 
Court might say. And indeed on the facts of Ilasçu the Court found that obligation discharged, 
employing a standard of review so deferential that it was essentially meaningless – all it took to 
satisfy it was for Moldova to demonstrate the desire to take back control over Transdniestria at 
some point in the future.105  
When it comes to the more specific obligation to secure the rights of individual 
applicants, it may have some practical relevance, but again not hugely so. In the vast majority of 
cases the entity controlling the area, and thus having the actual capacity to violate or secure the 
applicants’ rights, will be antagonistic to the central State authorities and there is only so much 
that the latter will be able to do.  If we look at the facts of Catan, for example, in which the Court 
had found Moldova to have already discharged its positive obligations regarding schools in 
Trandniestria which wanted to use the Latin script, we will see that the actual enjoyment of the 
rights in question depends foremost on the separatist authorities. If the Catan judgment had any 
positive impact on the matter (and we do not know whether it actually did), it would be because 
of the Russian side of the case, as it is Russia that has decisive influence over the separatists. In 
short, the residual positive obligations articulated by the Court are in most instances likely to 
have only a marginal benefit. 
The third problem with the idea of residual positive obligation grounded in title is that it 
logically requires the Court to pronounce on the sovereignty over the contested territory if it 
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wishes to find a violation of the residual obligation. The sovereignty question may or may not be 
legally straightforward, and as we have seen the Court has certainly pronounced on such issues 
in the past, as with respect to northern Cyprus or Transdniestria. However, as soon as that 
question became legally complex, as it did with regard to Kosovo and Serbia, the Court in Azemi 
avoided it by watering the residual obligation so much that Serbia could not have violated it even 
if the obligation had existed in the first place.  
But the sovereignty question may be legally easy yet still politically fraught with 
difficulty. Consider only Crimea and the multitude of interstate and individual cases dealing with 
the conflict in Ukraine. One can easily imagine that the Ukrainian government would positively 
want the Court to affirm its continued sovereignty over Crimea, whatever the precise obligations 
at stake might be, whereas Russia would accept the ECHR’s applicability to its own actions in 
Crimea but would deeply resent any adverse finding by the Court on the sovereignty question.106 
We personally do not have a problem with the Court antagonizing Russia or any other powerful 
State – on the contrary. But is this really worth doing if it has no meaningful impact on 
improving the human rights of any affected individuals, and if the Court’s pronouncements are 
used only instrumentally in a sovereignty dispute?  
The Court may well find itself in an unenviable position if a factual pattern emerges 
which alleges violations of residual obligations on the part of Ukraine which are of similar 
gravity to Ilasçu, so that it could not easily pull an Azemi avoidance manoeuvre. In such a case, 
again, if it wishes to find a violation of the residual obligation it must also rule that Ukraine 
remains the sovereign of Crimea. It would not have to rule on sovereignty for any violation on 
the part of Russia, whose jurisdiction can simply be based on the effective control over the area, 
whether obtained lawfully or unlawfully.107 It is thus manifest that, although the Court’s Ilasçu 
jurisprudence was motivated by good intentions, it carries with it significant risks. At least to our 
eyes, the costs would seem to clearly outweigh the benefits. And while it is unlikely that the 
Court would overrule Ilasçu expressly,108 it may nonetheless choose to apply it very narrowly. 
What, then, would be the possible alternatives? 
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There are, in our view, two such viable alternatives. The first is to return to the traditional 
binary approach – jurisdiction as a purely factual notion of territorial control, which may be 
presumed in territories over which the State has title. But once that presumption is rebutted, the 
State will no longer have jurisdiction, and therefore no positive obligations. This is the approach 
that we would endorse. Its principal virtue is its clarity, both regarding the factual control test 
and the consequences that follow.109 Once engaged, the full positive obligation to secure human 
rights in the area would apply. On the other hand, this approach may, in exceptional cases, be 
underinclusive, in the sense that there would be things that the State could do to mitigate an 
adverse situation for an individual, as in Ilasçu, which do not require territorial control. As we 
explained above, however, such situations will be rare, because the residual positive obligation 
as articulated by the Court has so little bite. The underinclusiveness is, in other words, offset by 
the clarity and manageability of the jurisdictional test, which applies in essentially the same way 
both intra- and extraterritorially.  
The second alternative would be to apply a more functional approach, which would tie 
the emergence of positive obligations directly to the state’s capacity to fulfil them. Such capacity 
would vary depending on the level of influence it exercises in any given area. Whereas the 
binary approach is an all-or-nothing one in terms of the applicability of positive obligations, here 
they would be divided and tailored depending on the circumstances.110 The basis of the 
obligations would not, however, be in sovereignty over the territory, but in the capacity to fulfil 
these obligations as a matter of fact.111 In other words, the positive obligation is not only flexible 
but it is not residual, since its basis is in capacity rather than in title; in particular, the Court 
would not need to rule in any way on a sovereignty dispute regarding the specific territory in 
question.  
We can observe a similar approach in the Bosnian Genocide case, in which the ICJ 
circumscribed the positive obligation of states to prevent genocide (which it held applied even 
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extraterritorially) by reference to the level of State ability to fulfil it.112 Another useful analogy is 
to the threshold of belligerent occupation in IHL. Scholars are divided in that regard between the 
adherents of a more traditional, binary approach, in which occupation requires boots on the 
ground and exists either fully or not at all, and the advocates of a more functional approach, in 
which the status of occupation, and the level of obligations that flow from it, are more matters of 
degree than of bright lines.113 The paradigmatic example around which this debate is normally 
had is of course Israel’s position with regard to Gaza, in which it (generally) does not have boots 
on the ground but over which it has a an enormous degree of influence.114  
Unlike the traditional binary approach, the functional model does not suffer from 
concerns about underinclusiveness. The problem with the functional model, however, is that it 
effectively destroys jurisdiction as a preliminary threshold inquiry – positive obligations will 
exist whenever they should exist, in the Court’s appreciation, and this is always going to be a 
subjective and substantive evaluation of some kind. The functional model lacks the clarity of its 
binary counterpart, and may lead to greater levels of disagreement on the bench about what is 
fitting and appropriate in any given circumstances. And, like the ECtHR’s Ilasçu approach, it 
might still not do much in practice. Unlike Ilasçu, however, the formal basis for this model is not 
territorial sovereignty, which becomes an irrelevant factor in the inquiry. The Court could, in 
other words, take a functional approach to Ukraine’s positive obligation to someone in Crimea 
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The flow of cases dealing with contested territories, especially in Eastern Europe, is not going to 
be abating in the near-to-medium term. There is therefore an urgent need for the European Court 
to adopt a coherent, principled approach to such cases,115 especially because they are also 
related, legally, factually and politically, to situations of extraterritorial application. Post Al-
Skeini the Court’s approach to extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 
seems to be evolving in the right (more factual, and more expansive) direction. Within contested 
territories, however, the Court’s Ilasçu jurisprudence remains problematic. As we have seen, the 
whole idea of residual obligations based in sovereignty is especially challenging in situations of 
territorial contestation which are chronic, and in which the contestation happens between two 
States (as with Ukraine and Russia over Crimea) or between a State and an entity which has a 
legally arguable claim to statehood (as with Serbia and Kosovo). If the Court has to rule on the 
sovereignty claims in such cases – at is logically has to if it wishes to find a violation of the 
residual positive obligation – it runs the risk of provoking significant political backlash without 
doing much, if anything, to meaningfully advance the human rights of the individuals concerned. 
We do not think it wise, especially in the current political climate, for the Court to be deciding on 
say (the lack of) Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea when it has better alternatives available, such 
as the binary and functional approaches we have looked at above. 
This article has looked primarily at the threshold jurisdictional question. But as we have 
said at the outset that jurisdictional question is in reality connected with how the Convention is 
expected to apply on the merits.116 We have seen how flexible positive obligations can be in the 
context of contested territories. Such flexibility could in appropriate situations be further 
enhanced by taking into account other relevant areas of international law, such as IHL – e.g. in 
the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In other, stable and chronic situations of territorial 
contestation, as e.g. with regard to Northern Cyprus, the Court has also shown a willingness to 
normalize such situations somewhat117 – consider how in Demopoulos the Court required, for 
admissibility purposes, the exhaustion of internal remedies provided by the separatist TRNC.118 
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Clearly, the experience of the ECHR with contested territories is one that other human 
rights bodies can draw lessons from. Our focus was solely on the ECHR, but contested territories 
of the kind we have examined exist all over the world, and are probably more common outside 
Europe than within it. Just as it is inevitable that the European Court will have to deal more 
extensively with such situations in the future, so will other human rights courts and treaty 
bodies.119 The main lesson to learn from the European experience, we think, is that good 
intentions do not necessarily translate to the most human rights-friendly outcomes.  
Finally, we would note that the problems we have examined are by no means unique to 
human rights treaties. There is ongoing litigation, for example, as to how investment treaties 
would apply vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia with respect to foreign investments in Crimea.120 The 
relevant dispute settlement mechanisms can also draw on the ECHR experience with contested 
territories – the fundamental dilemma (which need not be resolved in the same way in different 
branches of international law) is whether to primarily look at the facts on the ground or at formal 
considerations such as sovereignty as sources of legal obligation. At least in human rights law, 
our preference is strongly for the former. 
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